Shai-Halud Supply Chain Campaign — Expanded Impact & Vercel Response

Summary​

The Shai-Halud supply chain campaign has escalated. What began with the Qix compromise affecting ~18 core npm packages (chalk, debug, ansi-styles, etc.) has since spread:

• 
  Over 40 additional packages attacked via the Tinycolor “worm” vector.
  
  
• 
  The CrowdStrike / crowdstrike-publisher namespace was also compromised, with multiple trojanized releases.
  
  
• 
  The DuckDB maintainer account (duckdb_admin) published malicious versions matching the same wallet-drainer malware used in the Qix incidents. No Vercel customers were impacted in that DuckDB subset.
  

Impact to Vercel Customers​

• 
  We identified a small set of 10 Vercel customer projects whose builds depended (directly or transitively) on the compromised package versions.
  
  
• 
  Impacted customers have been notified and provided with project-level guidance.
  
  
• 
  In the DuckDB incident, no Vercel customer build was affected.
  

What We Did​

Action	Status
Blocklisted known compromised versions from the Tinycolor, CrowdStrike, Qix, and DuckDB-affected packages	Completed
Purged build caches for Vercel projects using those versions	Completed for impacted projects
Coordinated safe rebuilds with clean dependencies / pinned safe versions	In progress / completed for impacted ones
Raised platform alerting & detection thresholds for new package publishes matching the Shai-Halud indicators	Elevated monitoring active

What We’re Watching & Doing​

• 
  Working closely with npm, open-source maintainers, and ecosystem security partners to track any further spread of Shai-Halud.
  
  
• 
  Enhancing our supply chain defenses so that
  
  deployments on Vercel remain secure by default
  
  : stricter policies on lifecycle/postinstall scripts, lockfile hygiene, and registry validation.
  
  
• 
  Tightening internal CI/CD controls and developer tooling to catch suspicious package behavior early.
  

Recommendations for Vercel Users​

• 
  For teams using pnpm, consider enabling the new minimumReleaseAge setting introduced in pnpm 10.16 to delay dependency updates (e.g., 24 hours). This helps reduce risk from compromised versions that are discovered and removed shortly after publishing.
  
  
• 
  Audit your dependencies (direct & transitive) to check for packages from these affected namespaces.
  
  
• 
  Rebuild with pinned safe versions and clean lockfiles (pnpm ci).
  
  
• 
  Rotate any npm / GitHub / CI/CD tokens that may have been used in environments where compromised dependencies were present.
  
  
• 
  Inspect GitHub repos for unauthorized workflows or unexpected .github/workflows additions.
  
  
• 
  Enforce least privilege (especially in automated workflows), and limit lifecycle script permissions.
  

Timeline​

• 
  September 8, 2025
  
  — Qix / Tinycolor / core package compromise discovered.
  
  
• 
  September 9, 2025
  
  — DuckDB issue identified.
  
  
• 
  September 15-16, 2025
  
  — CrowdStrike / Tinycolor “worm” style propagation detected; Vercel detection expanded.
  
  
• 
  September 16, 2025
  
  — Customer notifications, cache purges, safe rebuilds underway.
  

References​

• 
  Socket: Tinycolor supply chain attack affects 40+ packages
  
  
• 
  Socket: Ongoing supply chain attack targets CrowdStrike npm packages
  
  
• 
  Aikido Security: Qix / core package analysis
  
  
• 
  Nx Advisory: s1ngularity attack
  

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